Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Elsie Roach v. John Kyremes : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
H. G. Metos; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Roach v. Kyremes, No. 7315 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1091

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

~l
~~

.. .

·~

i

~

r

~ ,~_L '->

Case No. 7315

IN mE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ELSIE ROACH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs..

JOHN KYREMES,
Defendant ,and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

H. G. METOS,
Attorney for Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page

--- ..... ---- .. ----------------------- .. -.. --- .. ----- .. ---------------------------

1

Assignment of Errors _________________________ -----------------------------------------·------

3

Statement of Facts

Argument
pa}~t~t I

1
~

---------·------- --------- .. ------ .. -------------------------------- ..

~------

----------------

3

3
Statutes ·Cited

Section 57-7-14 3, U. C.A. 19 4 3----------------------------------------------------------

/D

1/

5

Cases Cited
Armbruster vs. Gray, 2 8 2 N. W. 3 4 3------------------------------------------------

7

Krupien vs. Doolittle, 16 9 A. 2 8 2----------------------------------------------------

7

Laffler vs. Laffer, 142 A. 545----------------------------------~-----------------------

7

Legum vs. State, 17 3 A. 56 5------------------------------------------------------------

5

Lindloff vs. Duecker, 2 51 N. W. 6 9 9------------------------------------------------

6

Marti vs. American Smelting & Refining Co., 63 P. 184;
2 3 Utah 52 ------------------------·-------------------------------------------------------- 11
Mingus vs. Olsson, 2 01 P. 2nd 4 9 5; -------- Utah -------- --------------------

9

Murphy vs. Granz, 17 A. 2nd 4 4 9----------------------------------------------------

8

Nelson vs. Lott, 17 P. 2nd 272, 81 Utah 265 .... ---------------------------- 11
Reid vs. Owens, 93 P. 2nd 680, 98 Utah 50------------·------------------------

9·

Southeastern Telephone Co. vs. Payne, 6 9 S.W. 2nd 35 8--------------

5

Tio vs. Malter, 2 4 7 N. W. 7 7 2----------------------------------------------------------

8

Texts Cited
5 Am. Jur.,. p. 6 0 8----------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

53 Am. Jur., p. 4 4 7 ------·-- ------------------------------------------------------------------ 11
53 Am. Jur., p. 4 8 7-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
Blashfield's Cyc. of Automobile Law, Sec. 1254---------------------------Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ELSIE ROACH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
7315

vs.

JOHN KYREMES,
Defendant and A'(p pellant.
1

APPELLAN·T 'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arose out of a collision between appellant's car and the plaintiff while she was walking along
Redwood Road on a dark and stormy evening on November 7, 1947.
The plaintiff in her .complaint charged that on the
evening of November 7, 1947, she alighted from a street
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car at 21st South and Redwood Road ''and no sidewalks
being available, began to make her way along the 'vest
shoulder, of the pavement, of Redwood Road, walking
in a southerly direction," and that defendant, who was
driving an automobile in a southerly direction, struck
her.
The main facts in this case are without dispute. It
ap·pears that s~ortly after seven o'clock P. M. of said
day, plaintiff and another young lady were vvalking
towards their home in a southerly direction along Redwood Road, south of 21st South Street. It was dark and
stormy, visibility was very poor. The defendant was
driving a 1936 Plymouth car in the same direction and
at the time of the collision he was driving to his home.
Plaintiff was 23 years of age, wore an artificial right
leg, the leg having been amputated about ten years
prior to the accident on account of a bone infection.
There was a sidewalk for the use of pedestrians on the
easterly side of the highway which lead to pJaintiff 's
home. Redwood R·oad is a paved highway, 38 feet, 6
inches wide, paved with black top, with gravel shoulders
on each side.
The plaintiff's own evidence shows that she was
struck by defendant at a point of more than five feet
east of the west edge of the highway. Her companion
was also struck and she came to rest in the center lane
of the highway. In other words, plaintiff was struck in
the lane normally used by automobiles in traveling along
the highway. Defendant did not see plaintiff until after
he struck her. He was going app-roximately 20 miles
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an hour at the time of the impact and stopped his autoInobile ''ithin 15 feet. Plaintiff and her companion
testified that ears \Yere 'passing ·up and down the high\Yay and that they did not see or hear plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff's artificial leg was bent and slightly
damaged and she suffered minor injuries.

ASSIGNMEN'T OF ERRO·Rs
RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL
The
versal:
1.
gence.

ap~pellant

assigns the following errors for re-

That plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-

That the court failed to charge the jury as to
the relative rights of the parties to the use of the high\vay.
2.

3. Court's instruction No. 11 is erroneous and not
the law.
4. ·Court's instruction No. 12 is argumentative,
prejudicial and an invasion of the province of the jury
by assuming facts that were not admitted.
5. The Court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instructions No. 4, 5, and 6.

ARGUMENT
-

,Pt:!)./N f- ~-

The Court's instruction number 11 is erroneous in
that it fails to fu.lly state the law and the relativ-e rights
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of 1automobile drivers and pedestrians using the highway, as under the. circumstances plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence.
It is contended by the appellant that under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in walking in the lane of the portion used by automobiles in that she failed to use ordinary care and caution under the circumstances. She
voluntarily placed herself in a perilous position. The
trial court, however, instructed the jury that plaintiff
could walk on any 1part of the highway that she desired.
'V e contend that instruction number 11 is erroneous and
is not a correct statement of the law. This instruction
reads as follows :
"You are instructed that it is undisputed inthis case that a sidewalk existed on the east side
of Redwood Road, where the accident occurred,
for the use of pedestrians. There is no law to
~rohibit a pedestrian from walking at that location, on the shoulder of a highway or on the edge
of the highway, or in the center of either lane
of said highway. The question in this case is not
whether the plaintiff had a right to walk where
she was walking, nor is it whether she was doing
an unlawful act in walking in said place. The
Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff was not
walking on the sidewalk. The exact place where
she was walking is a question for you to decide.
When you decide that, the question then is, does
a preponderance of the evidence show that the
plaintiff failed to use due care for her own safety
in walking where she was injured, that is, the care
that an ordinary prudent woman, under the cirSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
cumstances, would have used. If she did not use
due care as aforesaid you are instructed to find
for the defendant and against the plaintiff, no
cause of action. ''
The above instruction fails to specify vvhat the
rights a pedestrian and motor vehicles using a highway
are; and nowhere in the Court's instructions is there
anything said as to the rights of motor vehicles on the
highway.
It is contended that :p1edestrians have a right to
walk along the highway, subject to the predominating
rights of ·motor vehicles, and that their rights are equal
and each is obliged to act with due regard to the movements of the other. Section 57-7-143, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, reads as follows :
. ''(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at
any point other than within a m-arked cross-walk
or within an unmarked cross-walk at an intersection, shall yield the right of way to all vehicles
upon the roadway."
In Blashfield's Cyc .. of Automobile Law and Practice., Section. 1254, it is stated:
"Pedestrians have a right to walk along the
high-way, subject to the predominating right of
motor vehicles.''
See Southeastern Telephone Co. vs. Payne,
Ky. 69 S.W. 2d, 358; Legum vs. State (Md.), 173
A. 565.
''A pedestrian on the highway at night on
whichever side he walks must exercise ordinary
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care, in the situation he 1puts himself and under
the circumstances ·surrounding him. The degree·
of caution which constitutes ordinary care varies
with the circumstances, and the greater the apparent danger, the greater the degree of caution.
''So one who uses the roadway without taking
any precautions for his own safety, though he can
see the lights of an automobile which strikes him
long before it reaches him, is guilty of contributory negligence barring recovery for the injury
received. The act of walking down the middle of
a highway on a dark night in a populous city is
one from which negligence may be inferred.''

In Am. Jur., Volume 5, P.age 608, it is stated:
''The rights of pedestrians and motor vehicles
on a public street are equal and each is obliged to
act with due regard to the movements of the
other."
In Lindloff vs. Duecker, (Iowa); 251 N. W. 699. The
decedent was walking in the center of the highway at
night and was struck and fatally injured. He was clad
in dark clothes and was struck by an on-coming automobile at the time that an automobile from the rear passed
him. The court in holding the pedestrian to be guilty
of contributory negligence stated:
''A pedestrian is at all times required to exercise ordinary .care for his own safety. He may
assume that persons ap,proaching him from either
direction will not violate the law and will -exercise
ordinary care in keeping .a lookout for him. This
however, does not relieve him from the duty of
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keeping a reasonable lookout, for his own safety,
for vehicles ap,proaching from the rear as well as
from the front. The pedestrians must exercise
the ordinary care for his own safety which an
ordinary prudent 1person would exercise to avoid
danger ...
~'We

think it is a rna tter of common knowledge
that it is a hazardous undertaking for a pedestrian
clad in dark clothes, without light or lantern, to
travel between center lines of a pavement, like the
one in question, and deliberately maintains that
position, with swiftly moving cars .approaching
from both directions. He may have the right so
to do, but if in the exercise of this right he is
placing himself in a perilous position, he must
take adequate precaution to guard against injury."
See Armbruster vs. Gray, (Iowa), 282 N. W. 343
upholding the above rule.
In Laffler vs. Laffer, et al., N. J. 142 A. 545, the
court held that one walking down the middle of the
highway on a dark night was precluded from recovery.
In K rupien vs. Doolittle, (Conn.), 169 A. 268, plaintiff was struck while walking on the pavement in line of

motor traffic and injured. The Court stated:
"The plaintiff was conscious that he was walking in the line of motor traffic going southerly,
and while he was within his legal rights in doing
so, he was required to exercise a degree of care
commensurate with the hazard thus assumed. One
of the vital requirements thus imposed upon him
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was to observe the traffic in the line of which he
was walking . . .
"It was the duty of the plaintiff to exercise
reasonable care, not only to avoid known dangers,
but to discover those to which his conduct might
expose him, and to be mindful of his surroundings.''
See Tio V'S. Malter, (Mich.), 247 N. W. 772, holding
that a pedestrian using highway at night must exercise
reasonable care for his own safety.
In Murphy vs. Granz, (N. H.), 17 A. 2d 449, apedestrian was killed while walking on a highway by defendant's car traveling in the same direction. The night
was dark, it was raining hard, the road was wet and
consisted of black hard surface 24 feet wide. Judgment
for plaintiff was set aside. The Court ·stating:
''The :p1edestrian must exercise due care to protect himself and not to impede traffic unreasonably. The degree of such care varies of course
with the circumstances of the particular case.
''Courts generally agree that other things
being equal, it is safer for one who walks along
a highway to keep to the left side, where he can
see perfectly the approach of cars coming in the
opposite direction and usually avoid them easily
by taking a step to the left . . .
"When the pedestrian occupies the right-hand
lane at night, the danger being enhanced to a high
degree, he must take materially greater precautions ...
''Customs and common sense have always dictated ... that pedestrians should walk along the
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edge of a highway so that they might step aside
for passing vehicles with the least danger to themselves and least obstruction to vehicular traffic ...
"When the pedestrian is in the right lane and
visibility is poor, the greater the risk; :p1r01portionally greater care is demanded of the pedestrian ...
''The decedent had a perfect right to be where
he was, but since he chose to be there, he was
bound as long as he remained to exercise the high
degree of care his situation made necessary.''

Reid vs. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 P. 2d 680.
In Mingus vs. Olsson, 201 P. 2d, 495; ______ Utah ______ ,
the Court stated:
''The rights of pedestrians to the use of public
streets are the same as those of motorists-neither
greater nor less.''
The trial court's instruction number 11 is not a
full statement of the law as it fails to point out to the
jury the rights of a pedestrian when the highway is
used by motor vehicles. No charge is given anyvvhere
in the Court's instruction as to the rights of the defendant to use the highway. Nothing is said about who
should yield the right of way when a vehicle approaches
a pedestrian.
Further, the pJaintiff being guilty of contributory
negligence, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict
should have been granted.
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The. ·Court erred
instr·uction No. 12 ..
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m gi.ving

to the Jury the Court's

The Trial Court's instruction No. 12 reads as follows:
"You are instructed that in determining
whether or not the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent in failing to act for her s·afety, as an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent p·erson would
have .acted, you may take into consideration the
following factors: the fear which plaintiff may
have had walking along the sidewalk; the fear
which plaintiff may have had for her safety in
leaving the highway to walk in unlighted areas;
the fear which plaintiff may have had in crossing
a wide, well-traveled highway to reach the other
side ; the personal inconvenience involved to the
plaintiff in crossing over 25 feet of muddy terrain
to get to the sidewalk; the length of the distance
which plaintiff anticipated walking along the right
side of Redwood R.oad; evidence that plaintiff
anticipated being picked up on the right side of
Redwood Road by the mother of her friend.''
The foregoing instruction is prejudicial and confusing and assumes as true certain facts stated therein.
The Plaintiff walked down the highway for one reason,
not for several reasons as the Court assumes in the
foregoing instruction. The instruction is argumentative
and an invasion on the part of the Court of the province
of the jury and erroneous under our practice. It practically vindicates the plaintiff from contributory negligence by directing to the jury excuses for plaintiff's
carelessness.
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53 Am. Jur., P. 477; Nelson vs. Lott, 17 P. 2d
272, 81 Utah 265; Marti V'S. Americ:an Smelting &
Refin.ing ·Co., 63 P. 184, 23 Utah 52.
- ;P4J ;• N-t :J The Court erre.d in refusing t.a give Defendant's requested instructions No. 4, 5, .and 6.)
The defendant requested the following instructions
which were refused by the trial Court :
''DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4
"You are further instructed that it is a universal rule of law that all persons must exercise
ordinary care when their conduct may affect any
other rperson, or when they may be affected by
the conduct of any other ~person. It is as much
the duty of a person to exercise ordinary care for
his own safety and protection as it is his duty to
exercise ordinary care with respect to the safety
and protection of other"s. Thus in the case on
trial it was as much the duty of the plaintiff to
exercise ordinary care for her own safety and
protection as it was the duty of the defendant to
exercise such care with respect to the plaintiff's
s-afety and protection.''
''DEFE·NDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5
''You are instructed that a pedestrian using the
highway is required to use such reasonable care,
circumspection, prudence and discretion as the
circumstances require, and an increase of care is
required of him -vvhere there is an increase of
danger, and if you find from the evidence in this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case that the plaintiff was traveling on the portion of the highway generally used by motor
vehicles to drive their automobiles thereon. and
that such act up·on the part of the 'Plaintiff was
not reasonable and .p,rudent under the circumstances for the safety and protection of herself,
then you are instructed to find in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff."

''DEFENDAN·T'S REQUESTED
INSTRUC·TION NUMBER 6
''You are instructed that it is undisputed in
this case that a sidewalk existed on the east side
of said highway where the accident occurred,
solely for the purpose and use of 'Pedestrians.
If, therefore, you find from the evidence in this
case that by reason of the weather, darkness
and other hazards then and there existing that
a reasonable and prudent person would not walk
on the highway but would use the sidewalk to
travel thereon and the plain tiff failed to do so,
then you are instructed to find in favor of the
defendant and against the :plaintiff."
In 53 Am. Jur., paragraph 626, page 487, it is stated:
"Each party to an action is entitled to have
the jury instructed with reference to his theory
of the case, where such theory is supported by
competent evidence and the instruction is 'Properly requested, and this is true although such
theory may be controverted by evidence of the
op:posing party.''
As already pointed out, the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to the rights of motor vehicles upon
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the highway and the rights of the defendant in this case
in driYing his automobile on the highway. The cases
cited in this brief hold that it is the duty of a person
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and protection and when circumstances require it, there is an
increase of care when there is an increase of danger,
and certainly in this case for the !plaintiff to walk
down in the middle of the lane while it was raining and
dark, was an act on her vart wherein she placed herself in a dangerous position. The defendant was entitled
to have these matters submitted to the jury and defendant's requested instructions numbered 4, 5, and 6 should
have been given by the trial court to the jury. The defendant was entitled .to have the theory of his defense
submitted to the jury and the refusal on the part of the
trial court was error.
We respectfully submit that the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff should be reversed and a new trial
granted.
Respectfully submitted,

H. G. METOS,
Attorney for Appelkunt.
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